Dan Markel, Jennifer Collins, and Ethan Leib ask whether criminal law should ever recognize family relationships, and, if so, when and how? As a descriptive summary, the book exhaustively documents the diverse ways that criminal law both advantages and burdens actors based on familial status. The criminal law creates "family ties benefits" when it confers testimonial privileges upon spouses, 5 exempts family members from prosecution for harboring fugitives, 6 permits parents to use corporal punishment against their children, 7 mitigates murder to manslaughter when provoked by adultery, 8 shows lenience toward
1.
The common law punished intentional damage to the property of another as the misdemeanor of malicious mischief. 52 AM. JUR. 2D Malicious Mischief § 1, at 122-24 (2000) . The Model Penal Code refers to the offense as "Criminal Mischief." MODEL PENAL CODE § 220.3 (1980) . which families and family members are advantaged or burdened by generally applicable criminal statutes, without regard to family status.
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By describing the ways that criminal law privileges and punishes actors based on family status, and by identifying the potential harms of the resulting benefits and burdens, Privilege or Punish unquestionably makes a significant contribution to a growing literature at the nexus of criminal and family law. This Feature seeks to complement that contribution by situating the authors' observations within the context of two considerations beyond Privilege or Punish's immediate focus of family ties benefits and burdens: chronological trends and the practical realities that can shape application of formal law. First, using the book's thorough cataloguing of criminal law's reactions to family status, this Feature seeks to distinguish between American criminal law's traditions and its more contemporary developments. Because Privilege or Punish is concerned with the criminal law's reliance on formal family status, antiquated and rarely enforced statutes against adultery and the dwindling number of manslaughter statutes that codify spousal infidelity as automatic grounds for provocation are collected alongside more recent inventions such as sex offender registries and the criminalization of the failure to pay child support. 24 Similarly, the book rightly condemns the criminal justice system's traditionally light hand toward violence in the family, but the contemporary burgeoning of law enforcement directed against domestic violence is largely beyond its scope. 25 By comparing the old against the new, this Feature credits an important shift in criminal law's treatment of families-from previously viewing families as private as long as they conformed to prevailing notions of family, to now enforcing its proscriptions even when it must adjust to do so within the home.
This Feature also explores a second important development in the criminal law's treatment of families: the recognition of the interplay between criminal law and procedure. Recent criminal law scholarship teaches us that real-world processes shape the practical effects of formal doctrine. 26 However, because it is concerned with distinctions based on formal family status, Privilege or Punish largely adheres to the four corners of formal statutory law, forestalling any discussion of what it deems to be the law "on the streets." 27 Perhaps because of that self-imposed limitation, the authors do not explore one reason why criminal law must sometimes adjust to families-not to privilege or punish family for family's sake, but instead to reach a domestic sphere that the law traditionally treated as private and impenetrable.
This Feature recasts Privilege or Punish's thorough cataloguing of the many collisions between formal criminal law and families through the lenses of time and procedural realities. Looking at changes to the criminal law's approach to families over time, Part I traces an evolution in criminal law's treatment of family boundaries and intrafamily privacy. Because criminal law was traditionally reluctant to intervene within families out of concern for intrafamily privacy, traditional criminal law also promoted and regulated the boundaries that divided properly constituted (and presumptively private) families from other relationships that could be policed. 28 Over time, however, the lines that separate formal families from other relationships have lost their traditional importance as criminal law has become more willing to enforce its proscriptions within families, despite traditional concerns about privacy. Many of the family ties benefits and burdens documented in Privilege or Punish were intended to regulate family boundaries and protect intrafamily privacy. As criminal law has learned to cross family boundaries, the benefits and burdens that served to regulate and protect those boundaries have begun to fall from favor.
Turning to the real-world implications of applying criminal law to families, Part II draws in part on my experience prosecuting cases involving families 29 and argues that criminal law has learned not only to reach within families, but also to react to the realities within them. The application of formal criminal law to families is often complicated by the past, present, and future relationships between affected family members. Because of the procedural difficulties of applying formal law to families, the criminal justice system must sometimes 26. See infra note 70.
27. MARKEL ET AL., supra note 4, at 152 (noting in a brief discussion of domestic violence reforms that "the law 'on the streets' falls a bit outside the purview of our book" because the book focuses on "facial benefits").
28.
See infra notes 32-37 and accompanying text.
29.
Prior to entering academia, I served as a Deputy District Attorney in Portland, Oregon, where I prosecuted domestic violence, child support, and parental responsibility cases, among other offenses.
yield to such relationships, not for the purpose of facilitating or preserving families per se, but to achieve the criminal law's usual objectives of retribution and deterrence within them.
i. past versus present
Privilege or Punish assumes that when criminal law yields to family status, it usually does so not to serve its accepted functions of retribution and deterrence, but instead with the separate purpose of facilitating certain family structures. For example, the authors conclude that "the criminal justice system, with a few exceptions, is not generally an appropriate place to foster a particular vision of family life."
30 Similarly, they summarize their wariness of the role that family status plays in criminal law by stating that the criminal justice system "should only rarely and cautiously serve as a vehicle for directly promoting the institution and goods of family life." 31 This assumption affects both the book's descriptive and its prescriptive content, as the authors depict a criminal law landscape crowded with family ties benefits and burdens and then conclude that most of them serve no legitimate retributive or utilitarian purpose.
The authors' depiction of criminal law's objectives regarding families is especially reflective of criminal law's traditional proscriptions. The feminist critique of criminal law (as with other areas of the law) is that it historically treated families, marriages, and domestic life as "private," insulated from state interference. 32 In light of criminal law's historical prioritization of intrafamily privacy, it is perhaps unsurprising that criminal law traditionally regulated the boundaries that determined family forms and thereby separated private sanctuaries 35 from public concern. Although criminal law was reluctant to intervene in the private affairs of properly constituted marriages, it did not hesitate to punish those who violated or challenged the normative ideals of family composition. From this perspective, as Melissa Murray has noted, prohibitions against incest, adultery, sodomy, prostitution, and birth control can all be seen as criminal law's regulation of marriage as a heterosexual and procreative institution.
36 So too could we cast the common law's provocation doctrine, which mitigated murder to manslaughter when directed against adulterous wives or interposing paramours. 37 In Privilege or Punish terms, criminal law's family ties benefits and burdens worked hand in hand to define, protect, reinforce, and police the contours of properly constituted families and the lines of intimacy that distinguished between the public and the private.
But contemporary reforms challenge the traditional narrative about criminal law's treatment of family and family status. Seven years after the Supreme Court recognized a right to contraception within marriages, 38 it extended its reasoning to unmarried couples. 39 States stopped enforcing how courts have used the rhetoric of "affective privacy" to privilege violence by upper-and middle-class men).
33.
See MARKEL ET AL., supra note 4, at 3-6.
34. See id. at 9-11, 26-27.
35. Logan, supra note 32, at 322, 338-48 (labeling the family as a "sanctuary" from the enforcement of criminal law). , at B7 (reporting the Utah Attorney General's policy that "it won't prosecute bigamy per se, but instead focuses its resources on going after child abuse, sex crimes, domestic violence, and welfare fraud within polygamous communities").
manslaughter abolishes adultery as a privileged source of emotion and entrusts juries to determine whether a reasonable person in the defendant's position would have been provoked into a heat of passion. 44 And although wives could not be prosecuted for harboring husbands at common law, currently federal law, the Model Penal Code, and a strong majority of states contain no family-based exceptions to harboring prohibitions. 45 In short, as even civil restrictions on marriage change faster than many of us ever imagined, 46 the criminal law no longer concerns itself with the policing of family boundaries. As a consequence, many of the family ties benefits and burdens set forth in Privilege or Punish are repealed, unenforced, and/or increasingly disfavored.
At the same time, contemporary criminal law is more willing to intervene within family boundaries to act upon conduct that was previously sanctioned as private. Privilege or Punish maintains that "the criminal law system still exhibits a great reluctance to interfere in the private life of the family," 47 but a separate story can be found in just how much the criminal law's approach to family privacy has changed. For example, criminal statutes mandating the payment of child support 48 and holding parents liable for the crimes of their children, 
45.
Privilege or Punish emphasizes the exemptions for family members who harbor fugitives, depicting current exceptions as "significantly broader" than the common law exemption for wives because they extend to other family members. MARKEL ET AL., supra note 4, at 7. The authors also emphasize that fourteen states "remarkably" exempt family members from harboring even those fugitives who committed serious felonies and another four reduce liability based on family status. Id. However, the authors also note that the majority of state penal codes, as well as federal law and the Model Penal Code, contain no family-based exceptions. the victims' preferences and even over virulent objection. 65 As Jeannie Suk has noted, prosecution in even misdemeanor domestic violence cases can result not only in the fines and incarceration that are traditional punishments in criminal cases, but also in the involuntary imposition of no-contact orders that force separation between offender and victim-even husband and wife-over the parties' expressed wishes. 66 Importantly, and contrary to the thesis of Privilege or Punish regarding formal family ties benefits and burdens, these interactions between criminal law and families are not for the purpose of "promoting the institution and goods of family life," but rather for the purpose of pursuing the usual deterrence and retributive aims of criminal law, even within families.
Because Privilege or Punish focuses on formal divisions based on family status, not the enforcement of general criminal law within families, it spends few pages outside the sentencing and corrections context discussing today's most common interactions between the criminal justice system and families. As a descriptive matter, however, the increased enforcement of criminal law within families runs counter to the book's depiction of a world dominated by benefits to defendants who victimize family members. Moreover, as a normative matter, if one believes that criminal law should seek deterrence and retribution even within families (as the authors surely do), to advocate only for the neutral enforcement of general criminal laws is too simple. The criminal justice system, after all, traditionally conferred privacy upon recognized families. It is no surprise, then, that the pursuit of criminal law objectives within families can present novel problems for police, prosecutors, and courts. As criminal law has learned to reach within families, it has also learned to react to their uniqueness. Many of these reactions are found not in the formal law on which Privilege or Punish focuses, but at the intersection between formal doctrine and real world practice. informal benefits and burdens upon family, 67 the authors maintain that scholars and policymakers must first have a framework for analyzing family ties benefits and burdens before applying that framework beyond formal law. 68 To "develop that framework in the first instance," they opt to "focus on facial benefits and burdens."
ii. formal doctrine versus pragmatic effects
69 By adopting this approach, they assume that a proper framework for analyzing benefits and burdens can be crafted by looking solely at formal law. However, a growing body of literature demonstrates the importance of examining formal doctrine in the context of the procedural realities that shape its application. 70 Moreover, even if one accepts the authors' framework, created through the lens of formal law, the application of that framework should take real world processes into account. Instead, Privilege or Punish focuses only on formal law, without tackling the practical difficulties of applying formal law within families. Indeed, the authors appear to recognize the importance of real-world processes when they note that formal law is often dominated by "life on the streets." 71 In light of this concession, their decision nevertheless to focus almost exclusively on formal law in isolation is puzzling. 72 67. To illustrate informal benefits, the authors note that a police officer might decide not to arrest a suspect for assaulting a family member, or that a juror might vote to acquit a husband of raping his wife because the juror believes, despite the law, that a man is entitled to demand sex from his wife. MARKEL ET AL., supra note 4, at xv. Examining formal law as it is applied is especially important in cases involving families. Privilege or Punish is wary of family-based criminal law in part because " [t] he American family is a far more complex entity today than our current system of benefits and burdens acknowledges."
73 But the authors concern themselves primarily with one dimension of this complexity, the evolving definition of "family." Families, however, no matter how they are defined, are also complex in their interpersonal, economic, and emotional dynamics. It is precisely because of these complexities that the criminal law cannot always remain "general." Instead, it must acknowledge and yield to the unique considerations that arise when criminal law reaches into the home.
To the extent that contemporary criminal law continues to make familybased distinctions, 74 many of these distinctions can be seen as pragmatic mechanisms through which criminal law must operate given the complexities of prosecuting offenses within families. For example, in Privilege or Punish, the authors argue that some state statutes give preferential treatment to family members by excluding incest from the registration and notification requirements triggered by other sexual offenses. 75 They also indicate that they are troubled when offenders are permitted to plead guilty to incest instead of generally applicable sexual abuse statutes. 76 However, these criticisms do not reflect the real-world difficulties of prosecuting child sex offenses, particularly those committed by family members. Children often delay reports of abuse because they fear the breakup of their family, the defendant's incarceration, or the anger or skepticism of other family members.
77 They can be reluctant to testify against fathers and guilt-inflicted when they do. 78 79 What sounds like sexual contact in a police report is reframed at trial as an innocent misunderstanding, blown out of proportion by police and prosecutors. As a consequence, the benefits of avoiding trial in intrafamily sexual abuse cases are considerable.
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Viewed in the context of plea bargaining realities, the criminal law's differential treatment of incest compared to other sex offenses can be seen not as a direct preference for family status, as Privilege or Punish largely assumes, but instead as a reaction to the realities of enforcing general criminal law prohibitions within families. Indeed, the vast majority of reported incest cases involve not the consensual adult relationships to which Privilege or Punish devotes so much tolerant attention, 81 but sexual abuse by fathers of children who cannot give legal consent. 82 Permitting defendants in such cases to plead
Harmful for Sex Abuse Victims?, PROSECUTOR, Nov.-Dec. 1994 , at 6, 6-7 (summarizing "mixed conclusions" of three separate studies but reporting that all researchers agreed that child sex abuse victims "registered high rates of stress and anxiety" before testifying, and that children who testified multiple times "tended not to improve as much as children who testified only once or not at all"); Roland C. , 1988) guilty to incest and thereby avoid the stigma of a rape or sexual abuse conviction and what would otherwise be mandatory sex offender registration is sometimes the best way to secure a conviction and incarceration while sparing the victim from testifying and avoiding the risk of acquittal. From a utilitarian perspective, a negotiated plea to incest is preferable to an acquittal because it permits incapacitation of the offender and provides deterrence. 83 Even a retributivist would favor an incest conviction over acquittal because it permits the imposition of deserved punishment. 84 However, because Privilege or Punish limits its focus to formal law, it overlooks the important utilitarian and retributive functions served by current plea bargaining and sex offense registration approaches for incest cases involving minor victims.
Privilege or Punish's brief discussion of domestic violence prosecutions similarly underestimates the impact of plea negotiations on the enforcement of general criminal law within families. Although the authors largely omit any discussion of contemporary law enforcement directed against domestic violence, they indicate that they would disfavor any approach that treated domestic violence offenders "better" than offenders who committed comparable crimes against strangers or acquaintances. 85 As an example, they compare diversion against traditional prosecution.
86 This quantification of punishment overlooks the picture on the ground. As an initial matter, it is unclear that diversion should be characterized as a more favorable result for ("Until recently, a widely held belief was that peer incest (i.e., between siblings and between cousins) was the most frequent . . . . Recent research . . . . suggests that intergenerational contact, especially father-daughter and stepfather-daughter, is the most prevalent . . . .") (citation omitted); Cass R. Sunstein, What Did Lawrence Hold? Of Autonomy, Desuetude, Sexuality, and Marriage, 2003 SUP. CT. REV. 27, 61 (observing that "most" incest cases "involve minors unable to give legal consent"). offenders than a traditional case disposition. Recognizing that traditional prosecutions can lead to repeated formal dispositions without addressing an offender's root problems, jurisdictions have increasingly turned to problemsolving courts. 87 Domestic violence diversion programs reflect this trend. 88 In exchange for dismissal of formal charges, these programs often require prolonged and intensive counseling aimed specifically at the underlying causes of intimate violence.
89 From a utilitarian perspective, meaningful diversion programs are arguably more effective than the pro forma convictions, fines, and brief periods of incarceration that are typical in misdemeanor assault cases. Because many defendants will be returning to relationships with their victims, sentencing options that involve ongoing monitoring of the defendant and seek to alter the defendant's propensity for violence against the victim could be more likely to prevent recidivism than a typical misdemeanor assault sentence. 90 formal law, it assumes that traditional punishment is the more appropriate response. Moreover, even if one accepts the depiction of diversion as a less serious intervention than conviction and incarceration, just as with intrafamily child sexual abuse cases, proving domestic violence cases beyond a reasonable doubt can be difficult, making a systemic alternative to trial attractive. Diversion programs, in particular, can enhance cooperation from victims who might otherwise refuse to testify. Whether out of loyalty, guilt, financial dependence, love, or some combination, many victims do not want their abusers to be incarcerated or stigmatized by criminal convictions. They do, however, want the violence to stop. The counseling and state supervision mandated by diversion offers the potential for future change without a formal conviction.
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Just as plea bargaining considerations might shape the criminal justice system's response to intrafamily crime, so can other forms of prosecutorial discretion that shape the enforcement of formal law. For example, Privilege or Punish is skeptical of both parental responsibility laws and the criminalization of the failure to pay child support. 92 In both instances, the authors indicate that noncriminal sanctions would be more appropriate. 93 However, contemporary law enforcement can be nuanced, and prosecutors and policymakers need not always choose between civil and criminal sanctions. In both the parental responsibility and child support contexts, the real-world implementation of statutory prohibitions can often soften seemingly draconian formal law. As a prosecutor, I worked on both child support enforcement and parental responsibility cases. In neither context were cases referred to us by general police officers. Civil servants staffed the child support cases, filing wage and tax refund garnishments, searching for unreported bank accounts, and meeting with obligor parents to establish payment agreements. They forwarded only the most willful failures of support to prosecutors to seek incarceration, and family court judges, not criminal courts, heard the resulting , Spring 2000, at 28, 33 (noting the clash between the realities of domestic violence prosecutions and "a strict application of our adversarial legal system," which may in domestic violence cases "exacerbate the problem and increase the danger to victims").
92. MARKEL ET AL., supra note 4, at 112-18 (applying a normative framework to parental responsibility laws); id. at 140-44.
93.
Id. at 114-15 (arguing that a negligence standard for parental liability would be more appropriate than the imposition of strict liability); id. at 144 (recommending a restorative justice process for failure to pay child support, "a solution that minimizes the use of the criminal sanction to ensure these obligations are met").
cases. 94 Similarly, parental responsibility prosecutions came to us not through unsympathetic patrol officers but from school counselors and social workers who worked with officers assigned to specialized units that focused on juveniles. When working with families to identify the underlying cause of their children's delinquency, the teams would only rarely invoke the possibility of charges against the parents, and even then did so primarily to overcome parental apathy.
My personal experiences applying criminal parental responsibility and child support statutes were not unusual. Although today's parental responsibility laws have early roots, 95 they must be evaluated in the context of other juvenile justice reforms. In the mid-nineties, arguably the height of the most recent wave of juvenile crime prevention efforts, the Department of Justice concluded that " [w] hile some states impose criminal liability on parents of delinquent youth, many more have enacted less stringent types of parental responsibility laws."
96 For example, states require parents to attend delinquency proceedings, pay the costs of court proceedings or state detention or treatment of their children, attend counseling with their children, or participate in parental training courses. 97 The possibility of criminal charges is often used as leverage to persuade otherwise uncooperative parents to participate in such programs, 98 perhaps explaining in part why law enforcement supports parental responsibility laws even as it rarely enforces them formally. Instead, we most often filed civil contempt proceedings. See supra notes 87-92 and accompanying text. In one case, a self-employed obligor who reported annual losses to the Internal Revenue Service while mysteriously supporting his own seemingly comfortable lifestyle told a judge that a contempt finding was acceptable to him because he could use some time off and would bring a book to the jail cell. Within twenty-four hours I received a phone call from a Sheriff's Deputy: a prisoner who had been removed from his cell for work duty to line the rising Willamette River with sandbags wanted me to know he could write a check for sixteen thousand dollars if I could get him out of the rain. TIMES, May 4, 1989 , at A18 (noting that a California parental responsibility law was "intended to give the police leverage in pressing parents to meet some minimal standards of supervision in a culture of poverty where family control has often broken down").
99. An empirical study of the enforcement of local parental responsibility laws in Oregon found that the laws were rarely enforced, but that police chiefs nevertheless supported them. Leslie treat incarceration as a first or last resort requires a look beyond formal law to discretionary charging decisions. To point out, as I have, that cases involving intrafamily sexual and physical violence might be charged, plea bargained, or sentenced differently than other cases is not to advocate the efficacy or moral appropriateness of that reality. Domestic violence scholars, for example, vigorously debate the merits of offering offenders treatment in lieu of prosecution.
107 Diversion programs might trouble retributivist theorists in particular because of the absence of formal punishment.
108 Even utilitarians debate the efficacy of treatment in lieu of punishment.
109 Similarly, for purposes of this Feature, I do not offer a fullthroated defense of the use of rarely enforced criminal charges, such as parental responsibility or criminal nonsupport statutes, as leverage to coerce statepreferred behavior. Any significant consideration of that practice would require a much broader discussion about the desirability of law enforcement discretion generally. 110 However, law enforcement's restriction of both parental responsibility and failure to support statutes to only the most derelict parents, even though discretionary and unformalized, at least arguably serves 551, 652 (1997) ("[I] n the community policing era, the accountability of police both to the communities they serve and to the rule of law is best assured by recognizing explicitly the inevitability-and even, properly managed, the desirability-of police discretion.").
retributive purposes by increasing the likelihood that a punished parent's conduct was voluntary. 111 From a utilitarian perspective, the discretionary enforcement of these prohibitions arguably limits prosecution to those parents whose future conduct can be affected and who have not responded to other forms of incentive. Privilege or Punish's focus on formal law forecloses exploration of the reasons that might justify these practices and, in doing so, misses the opportunity to discuss how criminal offenses relating to families are actually prosecuted.
conclusion
Privilege or Punish exhaustively documents the ways that criminal law gives effect to formal family status. It also identifies serious normative concerns that are raised when criminal law's proscriptions rise and fall with familial ties, and makes a compelling argument that we should consider family-based distinctions in criminal law with caution. 112 My observations in this Feature are intended to build on and amplify these important contributions to the growing literature on criminal law and families. When criminal law's traditions are distinguished from contemporary trends, and when formal law is analyzed not in the abstract but through the lens of real world processes that shape its application, Privilege or Punish's catalogue of family ties benefits and burdens tells an evolutionary tale about the interactions between criminal law and the definition of family: criminal law's treatment of families is not only moving, but in a direction that the book's authors would presumably desire-away from formal family-based distinctions.
Whereas criminal law traditionally valued family privacy over the enforcement of its prohibitions within families, the contemporary criminal justice system reaches within families with increasing regularity to enforce its proscriptions. As familial privacy has become less sacrosanct, criminal law's concern with the boundaries that serve to differentiate family relationships, and thereby separate the private from the public, has also waned. At the same 111. See C.L. TEN, CRIME, GUILT, AND PUNISHMENT: A PHILOSOPHICAL INTRODUCTION 46 (1987) ("We can then formulate retributive theories of punishment as those theories which maintain that punishment is justified because the offender has voluntarily committed a morally wrong act.").
112. Privilege and Punish also adds another dimension to the current debate over gay marriage, as we realize that a narrow definition of family excludes not only within tax, property, inheritance, and other civil laws, but also on questions involving life and liberty. See Hills, supra note 23, at 1427-28 (resisting Privilege or Punish's proposal to abolish family status from criminal law and instead favoring reform of the categories that define family).
time that criminal law has learned to reach within families, it has also learned to respond to them. Because of unique enforcement challenges presented by the application of formal law to families, the criminal justice system sometimes yields to familial considerations-not eagerly, but with reluctance, and not to promote or enforce preferred family forms, but to serve criminal law's traditional purposes of retribution and deterrence. While some would say that no discussion of criminal law and families is complete without a thorough consideration of the criminal justice system's changing response to domestic violence, 113 Privilege or Punish discusses the topic only briefly and in conclusion, in part because police and prosecutorial leniency toward domestic violence is often informal, and "the law 'on the streets' falls a bit outside the purview of [their] book."
114 Indeed, it is precisely because police and prosecutors enforce criminal law against domestic violence without regard to formal family status that the criminal law's response to domestic violence largely falls beyond the scope of the book. 115 But domestic violence enforcement is one of the most common contexts where contemporary criminal law intersects with family considerations, and thirty years of significant domestic violence reform demonstrates that the criminal law is learning how to apply itself within families and to react to family considerations. Moreover, criminal law often reaches into families without relying on formal family status to do so. Most domestic violence laws are defined not exclusively by a marriage between offender and victim, but by the intimate relationship between them-whether married or not, gay or straight, polyamorous or monogamous.
116
Privilege or Punish compellingly documents and critiques the ways that criminal law formally privileges and punishes actors based on family status. When reframed to account for changes in the criminal law's treatment of families over time, and the procedural realities that can shape practical application of formal law, the authors' observations also tell a broader story about the collisions between criminal law and families.
